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ABSTRACT
The monitoring of large dynamic networks is a major challenge for
a wide range of application. The complexity stems from properties
of the underlying graphs, in which slight local changes can lead to
sizable variations of global properties, e.g., under certain conditions,
a single link cut that may be overlooked during monitoring can
result in splitting the graph into two disconnected components.
Moreover, it is often difficult to determine whether a change will
propagate globally or remain local. Traditional graph theory mea-
sure such as the centrality or the assortativity of the graph are not
satisfying to characterize global properties of the graph. In this pa-
per, we tackle the problem of real-time monitoring of dynamic large
scale graphs by developing a geometric approach that leverages
notions of geometric curvature and recent development in graph
embeddings using Ollivier-Ricci curvature [47]. We illustrate the
use of our method by considering the practical case of monitoring
dynamic variations of global Internet using topology changes in-
formation provided by combining several BGP feeds. In particular,
we use our method to detect major events and changes via the
geometry of the embedding of the graph.
We first adapt the Ricci curvature to characterize the AS level
graph. The key idea is to detect changes in between consecutive
snapshots and to separate events that result in considerable geo-
metric alterations, from those that remain local. The variations of
curvature are evaluated through a set of landmarks as reference
points. We develop an anomaly tracking mechanism to detect large
variations of curvature that translate into major variations in the
geometry of the graph. These changes are then considered as major
BGP level events. In a second stage, we describe a mechanism for
identifying the network elements responsible for the set of coordi-
nated changes and isolate their geometric implications. We evaluate
this system in operational settings and show its performance in
real-life scenarios.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Monitoring large scale dynamic graphs such as the Internet, neu-
ronal connections or social networks is a challenging task, mainly
due to their rapidly changing properties. In particular, slight local
changes in a graph, such as a link removal, can result in major
variations in global properties. For instance, a few disconnected
components may yield great changes in the average lengths be-
tween vertices. It is often challenging to distinguish changes in
a graph that have only a local impact, from those that propagate
globally.
The relevance and difficulty of the efficient monitoring of large
scale networks is illustrated in the monitoring of global Internet
through information provided by the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP). BGP is the standard inter-domain routing protocol used over
Internet to primarily exchange reachability information among
Border routers in Autonomous Systems (AS). Dynamic variations
of the network resulting from local events, e.g., link failures, router
reboot, network operator policies changes or malicious events may
lead to a continuous stream of prefix updates or removal. The stream
that reflects localized changes in the topology of Internet can be
observed in the routing tables updates. While the impact of these
events remains generally localized on the affected ASes (e.g. an
outage in a stub AS might disconnect it from Internet and perturb
only direct communications) sometimes the reach is larger and the
impact deeper. In August 2017, a BGP leak 1 from a single stub AS,
(one of Google’s in this case), led to a partial black-out in Japan,
resulting into a major and large scope disruption [2]. These larger
scope events might affect multiple ASes, largely beyond the ones
directly involved in the source BGP event, in particular with how
widespread BGP security risks are [8].
Several methods for detecting and mitigating the impact of BGP-
level network events such as BGP hijacks have been introduced.
Proactive mechanisms, like RPKI [60], rely on cryptography mech-
anisms to authenticate the source of BGP announcements and the
sequence of updates [16]. Other approaches are reactive and involve
first detecting that a suspicious (or abnormal) event has happened
and then taking circumvention actions [35][33]. The detection of
1illegitimate advertisement for prefixes generally due to misconfiguations
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BGP related events is often implemented by third-parties that mon-
itor several BGP vantage points and have therefore a broader view
of the BGP activity [22][49]. These approaches leverage the charac-
teristics of BGP hijacks as seen in practice, and combine the views
from several vantage points (up to 100 collection points for some of
them) to implement heuristics to detect BGP events that are then
made available to AS owners [4].
While these approaches might be successful identifying the
source of the abnormal event, they are unfortunately incapable
of tracking the magnitude of an event within the BGP-derived AS
graph and of characterizing its importance and global impact. In
this paper, our aim is to develop a monitoring system that detects
quasi-instantaneously whether important changes have happened
in the network and determine how they may have affected the
network.
Understanding and characterizing the scope of BGP events is im-
portant both for security purposes and for troubleshooting [42][36].
We consider two application settings to motivate our method. In the
first setting we consider an AS, possibly multi-homed, that would
like to monitor large scale changes in the Internet connectivity.
In the second setting, we consider a third-party actor, possibly a
governmental authority, that is interested in monitoring the global
stability of Internet and in this capacity would like to detect ma-
jor changes on Internet connectivity. We will show later that the
approach developed in the paper is relevant to both scenarios.
Overview of the technique: At each snapshot, the network can
be defined as a graph with a set of vertices linked through edges.
Graph embedding techniques [18] can be applied to embed this
graph into a space endowed with a metric capturing the interre-
lation between local and global connectivity. The motivation for
embedding graphs in manifolds comes from results in continuous
manifold theory, namely the Gauss-Bonnet theorem [37] which re-
lates a local property, the curvature, to global topological properties
of the continuous manifold, e.g. number of holes. The Gauss-Bonnet
theorem ensures that an increase in curvature in one part of the
manifold, has to be compensated by a decrease in another part,
unless an important change in the topology has happened, i.e. the
manifold acts as a play-dough that when squeezed somewhere will
inflate somewhere else.
In this context we use a discretization of the Ricci curvature [48].
The Ricci curvature has been widely used in continuous manifold
theory to obtain volume and propagation inequalities such as the
Brunn-Minkowski theorem [14], and relates the local properties
of a manifold with its overall shape. The Ollivier-Ricci curvature
defines an extension of the Ricci curvature in discrete settings and
is defined through the notions of optimal transport and transport
plan. The optimal transport formalizes the problem of finding (if it
exists) a function that transforms a distribution of weight over a
set of vertices into another desired distribution, while minimizing
the product of the amount of transported weight with the distance
to which it was transported [41]. We provide further details in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. More in depth descriptions can also be found
in [37, 48].
By projecting every element of a graphG = (V ,E) with |V | = N
vertices with respect to the Ollivier-Ricci curvature, we obtain
a manifold located in RN where the coordinates of vertex x are
the Ollivier-Ricci curvatures κ(x ,y) to all other vertices y ∈ V . A
dynamic network can, therefore, be seen as a drifting process where
vertex positions are fluctuating over time. This embedding of the
graph in RN is called the Ollivier-Ricci graph Embedding (O.R.E.).
In practice, however, embedding the graph in a N dimensional
space is a daunting task. To reduce the dimensionality, we define
K landmarks that act as anchors in the space, and we project the
graph into a K << N -dimension space. We will present a way
of selecting the landmark in a way that the loss of information is
minimal.
Assuming we know this embedding, our goal is to detect major
changes in the geometry and topology of the BGP graph. When
a local change propagates globally within a manifold, it impacts
the overall curvature, i.e., it changes a large portion of the shortest
paths on the manifold (named geodesics).
Main contributions : The contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows:
(1) We propose in section 2.3, a geometric view-point to the
analysis of AS-level graphs as measured through multiple
BGP collectors.We introduce the backgroundmaterial briefly
describing the Riemannian geometry and present metrics
applicable to AS-level graphs. We use the Ricci curvature and
its extension, the Ollivier-Ricci Curvature to characterize
the geometry of discrete graphs, in particular the AS-level
graphs. We show that the Ollivier-Ricci [47] curvature can
be used as a metric to quantify the impact of a local change
on the geometry of the network. These changes can be in-
terpreted via the so-called optimal transport, thus giving a
detailed picture of how a change will affect the global net-
work traffic. This provides a new way of quantifying the
severity of BGP events.
(2) We tackle, in section 3.3, the problem of finding landmarks in
highly dynamic settings. We provide and validate a statistical
approach to discover optimal landmark points.
(3) We develop, in section 3, a monitoring system that uses the
Ollivier-Ricci curvature to evaluate if incoming BGP updates
have resulted in geometric changes over the global Internet.
(4) We evaluate, in section 4, this geometry change detection
framework over real BGP flows and show that the moni-
toring system detects all known major BGP-related events
of the past years. We also validate that local events can be
distinguished from global events. During the evaluation, we
compare the Ollivier-Ricci embedding metric with the tra-
ditional metrics (the shortest path distance or the spectral
distance [45]). We show that the Ollivier-Ricci distance ex-
hibits better stability in events associated to local changes
while showing great sensitivity for events of global changes.
We also show that the Ollivier-Ricci metric can uncover re-
lationships between ASes that are invisible to other metrics.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 BGP collection and AS level graphs
Interdomain routing is a collaborative effort among ASes, which in-
terconnects and exchanges routing information using the BGP pro-
tocol. Two main types of announcements messages are exchanged
between routers running the BGP protocol: updates that contain
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each an AS path composed of the list of ASes to cross in order to
reach a given prefix through the announcing neighboring AS, and
withdrawals announcing that a IP address prefix is not anymore
reachable through the announcing AS [17].
The decision to announce a path depends on route export poli-
cies that derive from contractual relationship between ASes as well
as traffic engineering implemented by ASes to manage the traffic ex-
changes. Generally, both ASes relationships and traffic engineering
policies are maintained confidential.
Any BGP router will have to deal with a continuous flow of
update or withdrawal messages that reflect every slight change in
the network topology. When receiving an update for a prefix, a
router check in his routing table if it already knows an AS path to it.
If this is the case, it will choose between the known active AS path
and the new incoming one [15]. This choice can be done using the
AS path length, i.e., a shorter AS path length being better, or through
more complex mechanism involving local preferences, multi-exit-
discriminator path attributes or AS policies. An updated path might
be re-announced to neighbors or rather filtered depending on the
AS policies. Sometimes AS path are inflated by repeating one of
several ASes to make them less likely to be chosen as forwarding
path as they become long [67].
Another characteristic of BGP is its lack of authentication for
routes announcement. It is therefore possible for an AS able to
advertise illegitimately paths for prefixes it does not own. These
illegitimate advertisements, called BGP Prefix hijacks, can impact
many ASes, or even the whole Internet, affecting service availabil-
ity and security of communications as packets might follow paths
they are not supposed to take, e.g., because surveillance is imple-
mented along this path. BGP hijack might also be caused by router
misconfiguration or malicious attacks [11].
When an AS path is announced, with two consecutive AS1 and
AS2, we can infer that there is a direct link between AS1 and AS2.
Therefore, by looking at the flow of announced paths coming from
neighboring ASes one can infer an AS level graph connecting ASes
that have appeared at least on one of the announced AS paths [29].
We leverage this approach to create each minute a snapshot of the
AS level graph. For this purpose we combine several BGP feeds
coming from several BGP collectors. As announcements are made
at prefix level, we can assign to each link in the AS level graph a
count attribute that measure the number of IP addresses that can be
reached through paths going through the link. We moreover assign
to each vertex in the graph some attributes including the number
of prefixes issued at the AS represented by the node, and ctime the
last time there was an update or an announcement relative to that
AS.
Indeed, the AS graphs generated by this approach are known to
be incomplete [20]. In particular, BGP path filtering policies do not
expose less preferred paths that would be chosen if the preferred
announced path were not available. Moreover, traffic engineering
and load balancing can further blur the real AS graph [34]. This
incompleteness adds a dimension to the challenge addressed in this
paper. The question we will address in this paper is "can we detect
major changes in Internet structure by just looking at incomplete
AS graphs that are gathered through a limited number of collection
points".
2.2 Riemanian Manifolds
Intuitively, a manifold is a surface in a multi-dimensional space
that can be locally mapped to an euclidean space, i.e., if we zoom
in enough on the surface it resembles an euclidean plane. A Rie-
mannian manifold is one that have attached to it a bilinear distance
metric, which then allows for a notion of angles and distances on
the manifold. One can look at a manifold from two perspectives:
the extrinsic view considers the manifold as an object embedded in
a (larger) euclidean space, while the intrinsic view considers prop-
erties determined solely by distance within the surface. In other
terms, the extrinsic view is the one of an observer that could look
at the manifold globally, and the intrinsic view is that of an ant
(or an army of ants) moving along the manifold. Relation between
these two perspectives has been a major question in geometry, e.g.
the "remarkable theorem" of Gauss, Theorema Egregium, states that
the curvature of a surface does not change if one bends the surface
without stretching it. Thus the curvature is an intrinsic invariant of
a surface [13]. The intrinsic and extrinsic viewpoints are fundamen-
tal in our work as well, since we aim at characterizing which local
changes will result in major global changes. Through the Theorema
Egregium the notion of curvature of a surface becomes a main tool
for doing this.
Curvature can be intimately related to the local behavior of
geodesics, i.e., shortest paths along the manifold. On a space with
(strictly) positive curvature, two distinct geodesics starting at two
points close to each other and pointing to the same destination will
ultimately converge to the same point [48]. Inversely with negative
curvature, two geodesics will drift apart getting further of each
other (see Figure 1). Several metrics exist for describing the curva-
Figure 1: In flat geometry, parallel lines are equidistant
while they tend to get further (resp. closer) in hyperbolic
(resp. spherical) space.
ture such as the sectional curvature [13], Gromov δ -hyperbolicity
[21], Bakry Émery Tensor [10], Forman-Ricci curvature [27] [62]
etc. [12]. In this paper, we use an extension of the Ricci curvature
to discrete objects, and particularly graphs, which we describe in
the following section.
2.3 Discrete curvature and the Ollivier-Ricci
curvature
Let’s define the discrete extension of Ricci curvature to a graphG =
(V ,E). This extension uses the concept of transportation cost d [51]
over a graph. Let’s assume a graph where a distance metric d(x ,y)
is defined between each pair of vertices (x ,y) ∈ V ×V . This distance
can be the minimum hop distance, a minimal weight distance or
any other arbitrary distance matrix. Consider distributions µ and
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ν over the vertex set V , i.e. µ(x) ≥ 0 for x ∈ V and ∑x ∈V µ(x) = 1.
The optimal transport θ∗(µ,ν ) is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Optimal Transport).
γ ∗(µ,ν ) = arg min
θ
∑
x,y∈V
γ (x ,y)d(x ,y), (1)
where the minimization is over all transport plans θ , i.e. θ : V ×V ∈
R such that
θ (x ,y) ≥ 0 for all x ,y ∈ V∑
y∈V
θ (x ,y) = µ(x) for all x ∈ V∑
x ∈V
θ (x ,y) = ν (y) for all y ∈ V . (2)
The value C(θ∗, µ,ν ) ≜ ∑x,y∈V θ∗(µ,ν )d(x ,y) is referred to as the
transportation distance.
Intuitively, the transportation distance evaluates the effort needed
to transport a mass distributed following a distribution µ(x) over
the different vertices of the graph to another mass distribution
ν (x). The optimal transport θ∗(µ,ν ) always exists and can be com-
puted exactly by solving the linear program (1), or approximated
efficiently (see for example [25]).
We can leverage the optimal transport to extend the Ricci curva-
ture to graphs.
Definition 2.2 (Ollivier’s Ricci curvature [47]). The Ollivier Ricci
curvature κ(x ,y) between two vertices x and y ∈ V is defined as:
κ(x ,y) = 1 − C(θ
∗, µx , µy )
d(x ,y) , (3)
where {µz for z ∈ V } is a family of distribution.
The distributions µz can be general, and we will specify which
distribution is suitable for our application later on. It can be shown
that the curvature is bounded in general as −2 ≤ κ(x ,y) ≤ 1 [48].
However for distribution µz such that half of the mass is positioned
on the central node and the remaining mass is distributed over the
neighbors, one can prove that −1 ≤ κ(x ,y) ≤ 1 [32].
Examples: To illustrate intuitively the Ollivier-Ricci curvature let
us look at three extreme cases. For these examples, we assume µz
put weights uniformly among neighbors of z, i.e. if dz is the number
of neighbors of vertex z, then µz (x) = 1dz if x is a neighbor of z,
and 0 otherwise.
• Let G = (V ,E) be a clique with N vertices. In this case all
neighbors of x are neighbors of y. So the optimal transport
plan θ∗(µx , µy ) has not to transport anything from neighbors
of x to neighbors of y and only needs to transport a mass
1
N−1 fromy to x . This means that the Ollivier-Ricci curvature
equal to κ(x ,y) = 1− 1N−1 . As N grows, the curvature tends
to its maximal value 1.
• LetG now be an alignment of nodes, i.e., a line graph, and
let x and y be any two distinct nodes on the graph. It is easy
to verify that the optimal transport θ∗(µx , µy ) corresponds
to transporting the mass in the left (resp. right) neighbor of
x to the left (resp. right) neighbor of y with a cost of d(x ,y),
therefore κ(x ,y) = 0.
• LetG be two N nodes star networks connected by a single
link. In this case, the optimal transport plan between the first
star center x and the second center y send all the masses in
neighbors of x to neighbors of y through the link connecting
the two stars with a distance cost of 3 and transport the
mass in y to x with a distance cost of 1. This means that the
optimal cost will be 3 − 2N resulting into an Ollivier-Ricci
curvature κ(x ,y) = −2 + 2N . It is noteworthy that if the
distribution µx (z) is such that half of the masses are posi-
tioned on x and y respectively with the remaining masses
are distributed evenly on their neighbors, the optimal trans-
port cost becomes 2− 32N and the Ollivier-Ricci curvature is
κ(x ,y) = −1 + 32N
Real graphs like the AS level graphs are not as simple as the above
examples. Nonetheless, when the Ollivier-Ricci curvature obtained
between two vertices is close to 1 this can be interpreted as the
two nodes are in a clique-like structure, i.e., there is a rich network
of link connecting the two nodes such that almost all nodes are
neighbors of each other. On the other hand, when we have negative
curvature close to −2, all the paths connecting the two vertices are
fully relying on a few nodes. This interpretation will be helpful
to understand the curvature variation, i.e., increase of curvature
means that the network is becoming more connected and decrease
of curvature is a sign of the emergence of a bottleneck.
3 OLLIVIER-RICCI EMBEDDING
MONITORING SYSTEM
In this section we will describe how to implement the Ollivier-Ricci
Embedding of the AS level graph. Recall that the embedding consists
of projecting the AS level graph into a K-dimensional Euclidean
subspace where each coordinate is the Ricci curvature measured
from a node of the graph (an AS) to one of the K landmarks. We
will define the curvature matrix as the N × K matrix where each
line contains the K dimensional projection of an AS that have seen
a BGP update during the graph collection snapshot.
3.1 Pre-processing steps
The previous section briefly introduced some background of the
theoretical tools used by the monitoring system we describe here.
We introduced the Ollivier-Ricci curvature as a metric relating local
property of a vertex to global properties of the graph.
We assume access to a series of (periodic) snapshots of the AS-
level BGP graphs. Each vertex representing an AS in this graph has
a set of attributes including a timestamp ctime identifying the last
time the AS has seen a prefix update or withdrawal announcement,
as well as the number of prefixes it announces. Each link also
contains a count attribute measuring the number of prefixes that
are announced to be reachable through this link.
Choice of mass distribution:
In order to derive the curvature we have to set a source and
destination mass distribution for the transport (µx and µy in (1)).
In his seminal paper, Ollivier [47] used a simplistic distribution that
distributes evenly the mass to transport over the neighbors of the
vertex. As explained in Section 2.3, we will put a mass in the center
node in order to ensure that the Ollivier-Ricci curvature between
each two nodes x and y remains in −1 ≤ κ(x ,y) ≤ 1.
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(a) Global effect event (b) Local effect event (c) Natural drift
Figure 2: Representative sample of the matrix ∆k for 3 different types of events. In Fig. 2a we show the Google leak Incident
that impacted Japan the 25th of August 2017. In Fig.2b we show a local BGP event, an outage, that impacts only slightly a
small part of the matrix (Brazil leak, see table 2). The event pictured in Fig. 2c corresponds to a period (5 Jan 2018, see in table
2) where there is no either local, outage or hijack, or global event in the network. However, there will still be a natural drift
coming from BGP updates and withdrawals.
.
However, this distribution assumes the same importance for
all neighbors which might be unrealistic. A good choice for this
distribution is to set it according to the amount of traffic flowing
from one AS to another. This information is often unavailable for
large networks. Alternatively, we need to use a measure that can
be readily obtained from BGP feeds.
As we store for each AS to AS link in the network a count at-
tribute that contains the number of IP addresses reachable through
this link, we set the source and destination mass distributions fol-
lowing the distribution of count to the neighbors. This distribution,
that is recalculated after each update or withdrawal, gives to each
neighbor a weight proportional to the number of IP addresses that is
accessible through them. Next, we use the Ollivier-Ricci curvature
derived from this measure.
Construction of curvature matrix:
In its steady state, the AS graph contains up to 80 K ASes and
200 K links that dynamically change because of permanent updates
and withdrawals. It is therefore unfeasible to monitor the variation
of curvature between all ASes and landmarks. We therefore resort
to use the ctime attribute to detect ASes that have undergone a
change and limit the computation to those ASes.
Let’s assume that during the snapshot k , m ASes have seen a
prefix update or withdrawal. We derive for the snapshot k am × L
matrix Ck , where L is the number of landmarks.
In order to detect changes we generate a similar matrix of cur-
vatures with the samem × L size, but for the last snapshot k − 1.
We then use ∆k = Ck − Ck−1 as the basic statistics for changes
detection. We show three examples of the ∆ matrix corresponding
to three different BGP events in Figure 2.
3.2 Monitoring
A dynamic graph will undergo continuous changes that will al-
ter the graph locally and potentially lead to small modifications
at the global level. This results in permanent fluctuations of the
curvature measure. Nonetheless, the Ollivier-Ricci variations can
become large when an event changes the geometry and impacts the
geodesics. Every non-zero value in the Ck , corresponds to either a
stretch or a compression of the underlying geometry and indicates a
change in the network conditions, possibly induced by an anomaly.
The sign of the spikes characterizes the effect the event had on
the connectivity. A positive spike means that the curvature has
increased, and that the neighborhoods of the changed AS are now
more connected to the rest of the network. Inversely, a negative
spike implies that the neighborhoods of the changed AS are more
dependent on a reduced number of connections with the landmarks.
Generally, a BGP hijacks or leaks generate a positive shift in the
Ricci curvature as they involve for the impacted vertex the emer-
gence of new and shorter paths [57]. Inversely, link (route) failures
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generally decrease the curvature and the diversity (see for example
Fig. 2b).
Interpretation of Curvature Matrix
As can be seen in Fig. 2, the matrix ∆ contains vertical and hori-
zontal alignments of decreases or increases in curvature. A column
with large variations of curvature means that the geometry toward
the landmark attached to this column has experienced a major
change. If several landmarks experience important changes, it in-
dicates a global change. Similarly, a horizontal alignment of large
variations means that the AS has seen major change toward all land-
marks. A global change will induce several horizontal and vertical
lines with important changes. We see also in Fig. 2c a representative
case showing the perpetual drift. Generally, the drift will show itself
with changes in the curvature that are limited to the impacted ASes
(represented by horizontal lines in the heatmap of the curvature
matrix). Local events and global events will exhibit vertical lines
in the heatmap, meaning that at least one of the landmarks has
seen curvature change to numerous ASes. The difference between
a local and a global event is in the strength of the change and the
number of large curvature changes. While the previous analysis is
intuitive, we need to define an automatized detection scheme.
We show in Fig 3 the sum of positive and negative values in
the ∆k matrix. Following the discussion in section 3.2, we observe
a behavior compatible with the Gauss-Bonnet theorem, i.e. zero
sum or very small one in period without major BGP events, and a
change in period with large event.
Figure 3: Time series of the sum of the positive (resp. nega-
tive) elements in ∆k along with the global sum.
From the previous discussion one can consider that monitoring
the sum of curvature is enough to detect large events. Nonetheless,
when the Gauss-Bonnet theorem is valid, the sum of curvature will
not change whatever large is the fluctuation. However, the Gauss-
Bonnet theorem is not formally valid for Ollivier-Ricci curvature.
This means, just looking at the sum of curvature might generate
false alarms and misdetections. We have therefore to define another
method to translate the matrix ∆k into a time-series over which
we will detect large events.
Analysis of Curvature MatrixAs said before columns or lines
structure in the matrixm × L matrix ∆k are representative of the
changes in the topology. Typically, the matrix contains several very
small values, relative to small curvature changes, and a limited
number of lines or columns with larger curvature changes. In order
to analyze the structure of this matrix we will use its singular
values 2, i.e., the roots of eigenvalues of the L × L matrix ∆kT ∆k .
The elements on the diagonal of ∆kT ∆k are the column-wise sum
of squares of ∆k matrix and its trace is the Frobenius norm of ∆k ,
∥∆k ∥F :
∥∆k ∥F =
∑
i
∑
j
(
δki j
)2
.
The Frobenius norm represent therefore the variance of the values
in ∆k , i.e., the strength of the curvature changes.
One can check that if the matrix ∆k contains a l non-zero column,
i.e., its rank is l , the matrix ∆kT ∆k will have l strictly positive
eigenvalues, or equivalently ∆k will have l non-zero singular values.
However, in practice, the curvaturematrix is filled with small values,
rather than 0, and only some of the lines or columns will have large
values. In such case, ∆k have some large singular values ∆kT ∆k
representing the large values columns, and other eigenvalues close
to 0. In such contexts, the stable rank defined as
γk =
∥∆k ∥F
λ0k
,
where λ0k is the largest eigenvalue of ∆
kT ∆k . γk is frequently used
as a robust estimator of the rank of a matrix, in particular for
generating low rank approximation of noisy matrices [23]. As the
rank is directly related to number of large columns in ∆k , the stable
rank estimates this number, i.e., a stable rank close to 1 means
that only a single column of ∆k has important changes, while a
large stable rank indicates large number of columns, i.e., landmarks,
having seen important changes. It is also noteworthy that λ0k have
the below property :
λ0k = max∥X ∥2,0
∥∆kX ∥2
∥X ∥2 .
In other terms, the largest singular value gives the largest norm
stretching that the ∆k matrix can generate.
The above observations lead into a simple anomaly detection
scheme. For each incoming matrix ∆, we evaluate the normalized
Frobenius norm, i.e., ∥∆k ∥F = ∥∆
k ∥F
m , wherem is the number of
ASes having seen changes in the kth snapshot, and the stable rank
of ∆k , i.e., γk . The set
{( ¯∥∆k ∥F ,γ−1k ) , k = 0, . . . , } defines a time
trajectory that will be used to detect large events. We use γ−1k in
place of γ−1k , as it is bounded, i.e., 0 < γ
−1
k < 1. A large event will
have a large value of ∥∆k ∥F and a small γ−1k , while a local event
might have large value of ∥∆k ∥F but will have a value of γk close
to 1.
3.3 Landmarks selection
Our approach relies on constructing the Ollivier-Ricci embedding
in RN . However, monitoring the variations of all distances is unfea-
sible over a real AS-level graph with over 60k vertices and 3.6 billion
distances [3]. We reduce the dimensionality by choosing a set of
L << N landmarks and only monitor the variation of curvature
towards them, i.e., we represent the position of vertex i by a vector
2Singular values are extension of eigenvalues to non-square matrices [7]
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Figure 4: Components of the monitoring system
Xi = (x ij ), j = 1, . . . L where x ij = κ(i, j) is the curvature from i
to landmark j. The essential property we are seeking to preserve
despite the dimensionality reduction, is that the variation of the
time series between time t and t + 1, denoted hereafter by the drift,
should be small when there are no major changes in the graph
underlying geometry and substantial when such a large change
happens. The landmarks should satisfy this property and we will
validate this claim in Sec. 4.
Choosing landmarks in a highly dynamic graph is a complex
task [40].
We considered multiple landmark selection process: (a) random
landmarks selection, (b) highest degree, (c) highest centrality, (d)
highest number of triangles, (e) Tier 1 and Tier 2 AS, a random
walk starting at (e) a random vertex or (g) at the collector node, and
finally (f) a lazy random walk that we introduced and which was
developed for this purpose.
In order to evaluate the performance of different landmark se-
lection methods, we define two metrics that are calculated over a
landmark set R. A first metric, S1, evaluates the diversity arising
from R, by assessing the proportion of distinct neighbors of vertices
in R among all possible neighbors, and S2 the average distance in
hops between landmarks, i.e.:
S1(R) =
 ⋃
v ∈R
N (v)
∑
w ∈R |N (w)|
S2(R) = 12|R |
∑
v ∈R
∑
w ∈R
d(v,w)
(4)
High diversity is a necessary condition for a landmark to have
high curvature. So we use the S1 metric as a low complexity proxy
to detecting potentially high curvatures. A good set of landmark
should therefore at the same time achieve a good diversity, large
value of S1, and be far apart, large value of S2. We consider 30 of
our collected AS graphs and run over them the different landmark
selection algorithm and see the outcomes. For random walk based
approaches (lazy random walk, fully random and random walk), we
do 10 runs each with 35k random steps (10k for 10 landmarks) and
for deterministic approach (triangle, degree, tier 1& 2), we execute
the code over the 30 graphs. We compute for each case the score
S1 and S2 of resulting landmarks obtained by different methods.
We report the average of S2 in 1 and look at the distribution of the
measure S1 for 20 landmarks in 5. We can see that the lazy random
Figure 5: Distribution of S1 for 20 landmarks for different
landmarks selection approaches
Landmarks
# of landmarks #10 (10K) # 20 (35K) # 30 (35k)
Lazy Rand Walk 5.447742 7.07428 5.2616129
Fully random 3.670968 4.118387 3.841935
Highest degree 1.123871 1.265484 1.106452
Highest centrality 1.16788 1.278206 1.125779
Highest triangle 1.144516 1.209032 0.984516
Mix Tier 1 and Tier 2 1.565161 1.548065 1.620645
Rand. Walk 1.859355 2.0933387 1.830323
Rand. Walk Ripe 1.741935 1.720806 1.823971
Table 1: Average of S2 for different landmarks selection ap-
proaches
walk achieves a better performance both in term of diversity and of
average distance, we will therefore use the 20 landmarks coming
from this method in the forthcoming.
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4 EVALUATION AND VALIDATION
The previous sections presented several components of a large-scale
graph monitoring system and its application to the particular case
of AS level BGP graph. We present in Fig. 4 the components of the
monitoring system. In this section, we will assert the performance
of our approach and compare it with other approaches.
4.1 Datasets
The first stage of the monitoring system pipeline is the BGP feeds
gathering.
For the results shown in this paper we used the python version
of libBGPstream, pybgpstream [5] and gathered BGP feeds coming
from all 13 active RIPE Routing Information Service open feeds
[6]. The BGP gathering tools use the approach described in section
2.1 to update an AS level graph that is saved each minute into
graph snapshot in a GML formatted file. Each trace is initiated with
an empty graph, meaning that there is a transient phase during
which the AS level graph size increases according to arriving BGP
updates. Generally after up to one hour, the graph reaches a steady
state with around 68 k ASes. It is noteworthy that even in steady
state the graph is permanently updated with new paths that appear
and one can never assume that the AS level graph is becoming
static. Because of the permanent dynamic of the AS level graph,
we are making the analysis over all snapshots regardless of being
in transient phase or steady state. As we will see this can result in
observing relatively large geometry changes that are arising from
gaining visibility for a large part of the topology.
As historical data are available going back for example to 1999
for the rrc00, we have reconstructed the BGP feeds as they were
announced during 8 different major BGP even of the past years (see
table 2 for a list of monitored events). In addition to these events, we
also run the BGP gathering components over long period without
known major events.
4.2 Complexity
The different steps of the monitoring system have different com-
plexities. We are currently executing the BGP gathering step on
a single computer using a multithreaded (4 threads) python code.
We are observing over different trace an average of 1200 BGP an-
nouncements per second, that can peak to up to 10 000 during
period of high intensity. The current non-optimized python code
is running in almost real-time, i.e., one second in the BGP feed is
processed in less than one sec, beyond when BGP updates peak
times when the current system lags. The memory usage of the tool
is relatively large, in particular the routes database might contain
up to 12 millions BGP route occupies around 6 GBytes of memory.
The most costly step of the monitoring system is the derivation
of the ∆ matrix. Let’s remind that this matrix containsm × L curva-
ture elements. As explained before, we have used throughout the
paper L = 20 landmarks. The number of ASes,m, that have seen
an update or withdrawal during an AS graph snapshot interval
varies accordingly to the dynamic of the network from 20 to more
than 10000. This means that we need to solve up to 200000 linear
programming optimization in the form given in Eq. 1. The main
issue is that each one of these optimizations needs a distance ma-
trix between all neighbors of source and destination vertices. Even
Date Name Trace
dura-
tion
#ASes #links Extend
of the
event
23 Jan
2008
Middle East
cable cut
7h00 ≈ 22K ≈ 40 K Medium
25 Aug
2017
Google
leakage
3h30 ≈ 60K ≈ 120K Large
21 Oct
2017
Brazil leak-
age
3h30 ≈ 60K ≈ 100K Large
22 Apr
2016
Innofield in-
cident
1h10 ≈ 8K ≈ 20K Large
12 Dec
2017
Russia
hijack
2h00 ≈ 12K ≈ 22K Large
21 Oct
2017
Before
Brazil
leakage
2h00 ≈ 13K ≈ 35K No
event
5 Jan
2018
NA 20h00 ≈ 60K ≈ 100K No
event
23 Apr
2016
NA 1h45 ≈ 18K ≈ 40K Medium
22 Apr
2016
After In-
nofield
incident
1h45 ≈ 14K ≈ 30K No
event
21 Oct
2017
Before
Brazil
Leakage
8h30 ≈ 55K ≈ 91K No
event
Table 2: List of major BGP events studied in this paper
if the calculating the shortest distance have a linear complexity
calculating this matrix 200000 times over a graph with up to 60K
nodes is challenging. Currently, using a single processor and with
a python code without major optimization, we are able to derive
the ∆ matrix and the event detection step, in average, in 3 minutes
for each snapshot, i.e., we have a 3 minutes of detection delay. We
are confident that this time can be reduced with a better imple-
mentation in a more suitable language and over a multiprocessor
machine.
4.3 Large-scale event detection validation
In this section we will see how the proposed monitoring system
behaves in real operational settings. However, before dealing with
our proposed system we have to compare it with alternative moni-
toring systems. Most of BGP monitoring systems target detection
of localized event like outage and more importantly BGP hijacks.
While these issues are indeed important, they generally have not
a global impact. In [61] and [19] the BGP update volumes were
used to detect and characterize large-scale BGP events. Both these
papers showed that although the update volume is correlated to
the scale of BGP events, this was not enough to construct a reliable
detector, because of it is hard to predict and detect BGP sessions
resets that can also result in large volume of updates.
Other alternative embedding metrics that could be used in or-
der to monitor changes toward landmarks are the shortest path
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distances and the spectral distances. The spectral distances are ob-
tained through a spectral projection of the AS level graph [45, 66].
We compare in Fig. 6 the distribution of the variations of these
embedding metrics toward some landmarks and compare it with
the Ollivier-Ricci embedding we have developed in this paper. We
would like embedding metrics to exhibit small variations when
strictly local events happen and large variations for large one. This
means that the most of the time a suitable embedding metric should
be around 0, with large value being less frequent. However, both
shortest path distance and spectral distances suffer from high sen-
sitivity to local changes. Any local change on the shortest distance
might result at least to +1 or -1 on the embedding metric. Spectral
distance is also know to be very sensitive to local neighborhood
change, i.e., node with same neighborhood are projected to the
same spectral coordinates, and slight change in neighborhood can
result in large variation of the spectral distance. The sensitivity of
the two alternative metrics can be seen in Fig. 6. The shortest dis-
tance metric show large discrete variation, and the spectral distance
exhibit also frequently large variation, while the Ollivier-RRicci em-
bedding show a higher concentration of values around 0 drift with
less frequent large values. This indicates that the two alternative
embedding metrics are likely to not have good performances for
graph monitoring applications. We will show in the forthcoming
that despite the two others Ollivier-Ricci embedding attain very
good performance for monitoring large-scale graphs.
We illustrate the method for large-xfscale even detection by
showing in Fig. 7a the time evolution of ∥∆k ∥F obtained over AS
level snapshots gathered around Aug. 25, 2017. As can be seen from
this diagram at 03:23 GMT the normalized energy ∥∆k ∥F exhibits
a large peak. At 03:22 GMT, it has been reported that in Chicago,
Illinois, Google generated a massive BGP leaks, that had major
consequences for the Internet in Japan, and therefore the peak
observed in 7a is related to this leak. The peak is well separated
from other points of the phase diagram showing that Google BGP
leak changed severely overall Internet geometry. A more in-depth
analysis of the ∆matrix shows a large increase of curvature, i.e., the
network becomes more similar to a clique and the overall shortest
distances decrease. This is characteristic of a BGP leak that provide
a lot of new paths to the network. We show in Fig. 7b, the phase
diagram, a 2 dimensional diagram with in the x-axis the normalized
energy, ∥∆k ∥F , and on the y-axis the inverse of the stable rank,
γ−1k relative to the previous time plot.As can be seen from phase
diagram there are several points that all happen after 3:23 GMT
with large ∥∆k ∥F > 1. All these points have overall decreasing
curvature, i.e., the new shortest paths leaked by the Google leakage
are withdrawn gradually. However, for all these point γ−1k > 0.7,
meaning that only a small number of landmarks are affected by the
change, making the change local. In other term the global event at
03:22 GMT is resolved by a sequence of more limited local events.
Similar behavior is observed for other large-scale event. We show
in Fig. 9a another event that happened in Oct. 21, 2017, when a
major BGP leakage happened in Brazil at 10:09 GMT. Here also we
see a large peak of ∥∆k ∥F with γ−1k < 0.7.
One typical question that arise is related to the dynamic building
of the AS level graph, i.e. new ASes and link are appearing progres-
sively in the graph. One can wonder if the addition of new nodes is
not perturbing the detection process, resulting into spurious events
that are caused by the collection process rather than real events
over Internet. We show in Fig. 8 the time evolution of the number
of AS nodes and links in the AS graph along with the evolution of
the energy in ∆k matrix around a detected large-scale event. As
can be seen from the picture at time of large increase in the number
of nodes and links there is a slight increase in the ∥∆k ∥F , that is
normal and expected, as overall by adding new nodes and links we
are changing the structure of the network. However, there is no
co-occurrence of large changes in with change in the number of
nodes or links, meaning that large-scale events are not impacted
by the dynamic process of building the AS graph on the fly. This is
a remarkable property that show the robustness of the large-scale
event detector.
4.4 Analysis in the wild
In this section we will describe outcomes of applying the AS graph
monitoring approach over traces containingwell-documented large-
scale events. We have selected a corpus of diverse incidents whose
influences were variable (from a local event as a local prefix hijack-
ing to global events such as an important black-out). We pick 8
events summarized in table 2. There have been 4 major BGP events
in 2016 and 2017 that get reported in major blogs monitoring BGP
events like the BGPMON blog [65]. All these events are reported in
table 2 as "large" events. We add to the table some datasets repre-
senting periods without any major reported events.
We show in Fig. 9 the phase diagram resulting from combining
all datasets in Table 2. We show the full phase diagram in Fig. 9a
and a zoom on the values with normalized energy larger than 1 in
Fig. 9b. As can be seen all major events that have been reported
in the major BGP blogs appear in the zoom region. Meaning that
all such events generate large spike in their normalized energy.
This observation confirms that the large-scale event detector spots
correctly all large-scale events. A more detailed analysis show that
all events are detected within 2 one minute AS level graph snapshot,
except from the "2008 cable cut" dataset which does not appear in
the large-scale event detection region. Nonetheless, we saw for this
dataset, several points with large energy (around 0.85) but high
(around 0.8) value of γ−1k that were compatible with large local
changes in the underlying geometry. A deeper analysis of the ∆
matrix at that times shows a decrease in curvature along with a
balancing curvature increase relative to only one or two landmarks.
These observations are consistent with reports (see [1]) that stated
that the cable cut was not reported until several day later as its
effect was not really felt globally.
4.5 Calibrating the large event detector
In Fig. 9 one can see a clear threshold for detecting large-scale event
at ∥∆k ∥F > 1. However, setting this threshold needs a little more
motivation. The ∆k matrix can be considered as a random matrix
with values distributed between 1 and -1. In [54], Rudelson et al.
derived, through an estimate of the smallest and largest singular
value, an asymptotic bound for the normalized Frobenius norm
of a random sub-gaussian matrix. Through this estimate for large
enough N , an L × N matrix A with independent and identically
distributed sub-gaussian entries with mean 0 and variance 1, the
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(a) Shortest path embedding (b) Spectral embedding (c) Ricci embedding
Figure 6: Distribution of the variations of 3 possible embedding metrics
(a) Google Leakage (b) Phase diagram of the Google leakage (c) Brazil Leakage
Figure 7: Validation of the large-scale events detection
Figure 8: Time evolution the AS level graph AS nodes and
links number
normalized Frobenius norm will be distributed following a χ2 distri-
bution with 1 degree of freedom. In our case, the curvature values in
δk are bounded, −2 ≤ δki j ≤ 2 and therefore there are sub-gaussian
and the theoretical conditions are valid.
Now if the entries of the δk matrix have a mean 0 and a variance
equal to α , one can expect that ∥∆
k ∥F
α will be distributed following a
χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. We tested if the empirical
distribution of ∥∆k ∥F is following a χ2 distribution with 1 degree of
freedom. It is a well known property of χ2 distributionwithν degree
of freedom that it is equivalent with a Gamma distribution with
parameters ( ν2 , 2). We fitted a Gamma distribution to the all ∥∆k ∥F
values gathered over all datasets and we estimated the parameter to
be (a = 0.49,b = 2.3) that is fully compatible with a χ2 distribution
with 1 degree of freedom showing that the theoretical asymptotic
distribution seems to hold in practice.
This asymptotic distribution gives us a way to derive the deci-
sion threshold for a large event. By setting a decision threshold at
T , i.e., if ∥∆k ∥F > T a large event is detected, the probability of
false alarm will be Eχ 2 (Tα ), where Eχ 2 (.) is the complementary cu-
mulative distribution function of the χ2 distribution with 1 degree
of freedom.
Empirically over all ∆ matrices we gathered, the elements in
the matrix have mean 8.6 × 10−5 and variance 3.5−2, meaning that
with a threshold T = 1 the probability of false alarm, i.e. wrongly
deciding that an observed spike is a large-scale event while it was
not, is less than 1.36×10−7 which gives in average a false alarm each
13,5 years (assuming one snapshot by minute). Interestingly even
with such a high threshold, we were able to detect all large-scale
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(a) Phase diagram of all datasets (b) Zoom of the all datasets phase diagram
Figure 9: Phase diagram obtained with all datasets described in Table 2
events reported during the past 3 years without any false alarm. As
we achieved a detection rate of 1 without false alarms, we did not
show the ROC curve [26] as the result would be trivial.
4.6 Interpretation of large curvature changes
In previous sections we described how to monitor and detect large
change in the geometry of AS level graphs. When such an event
happens, it is desirable to have some ideas about the source of the
problem and to implement a root cause analysis. Interestingly the
optimal transport plan θ∗ that is derived during the calculation of
Ollivier-Ricci curvature (see Eq. 1), gives a lot of insights about
the causes of the curvature changes. The optimal transport plan
θ∗(µx ,νy ) can be represented as a matrix where each row is relative
to a neighbor of the source x and each column is relative to a
neighbor of the destination y. One can therefore compare for 2
given nodes x and y this matrix before and after an large-scale
event. We show in Fig. 10 such a comparison using the difference
between two optimal transport plans for the node that have seen
the largest curvature change during a large-scale event. The Figure
shows clearly that the mass at ASN 23106 that used to be transferred
mainly through ASNs 4637 and 8928 (the dark blue elements in Fig.
10) are transferred after the large-scale event by ASNs 6461 and
40620 (the dark red elements in Fig. 10)
5 RELATEDWORKS
Anomaly detection of BGP feeds Many attempts have been
made to detect anomalous Internet events through dissecting BGP
updates and tables. A complete and recent survey of BGP Anomaly
detection techniques is provided in [9]. Among all these work [36]
used Fourier analysis tools to analyze routing update rates and to
relate them to BGP anomalies. Mei et al. developed BAlet, a wavelet
based approach that cluster fast changing BGP feeds to identify
possible source of large-scale anomalies [46]. Wavelet Transforms
Figure 10: Difference between the transport plan
were also used in the BGP-lens [53] to analyze the rate of updates
of per prefix. Other statistical approaches like PCA have also been
used [31] over BGP update rate.
Several approaches used machine learning techniques to detect
link failure or other direct anomalies like BGP Hijacks or indirect
one caused by routing overload generated by work propagation for
example [42, 44]. However, almost all of them leverage the rate of
BGP updates (see for more details [9]).
Gao et al. [29] infers the non-disclosed policies between ASes by
investigating their preferred routes. An "anomaly" is detected when
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the chosen path does not correspond to the expected policy. This
approach is very localized and cannot be extended to the whole
graph as it needs one of the monitored ASes to be affected by the
"anomaly" for the detection to happen. Moreover, inferring non-
disclosed policies might be hard specially with malicious actors.
While the above approaches target detecting BGP anomalies,
they are not dealing with the topic of this paper that is graph
monitoring and detecting large-scale event. Moreover, all the above
approaches are suffering from the self-similar and heavy tailed
structure of update rates caused by BGP session resets that are
known to result into large BGP exchanges and inflated update rates.
They also do not provide a way to detect further the location and to
interpret the anomalies, i.e., to infer the cause relative to AS graph
change to the observed surge in update rates.
Large-scale events detection: The previous described approaches
were not targeting specifically large-scale events. Comarela et al.
[24] similarly to us targeted large-scale. They aggregate next-hop
changes into a metric tensor. By looking at the concentration of
elements within the tensor, they proposed a large-scale events de-
tection system. However, they use a daily granularity, which is not
satisfactory for small time scale detection. The analysis also heavily
relies on hop-count changes that is not a stable enough metric to
understand the real evolution of the network as we discussed above
(see section 4.4). In comparison, we provide an almost real-time
event detection that is detecting a larger set of events that the one
that hop-count could detect. Chen et al. [19], extended this paper
and developed the LBE, a metric that aims into locating large-scale
events. However, LBE depends mainly on the number of BGP up-
dates happening between two detection time and not on the nature
of the update. In [64], PCA is used to separate updates triggered
by distinct underlying events. This separation simplifies the root
cause analysis but remains highly sensitive to false alarms.
Traffic volumes anomaly detection There exists a large litera-
ture on anomaly detection in traffic volumes, e.g., [59] [38]. Time
series analysis approaches are the most widely spread analytic tool
used in the context of anomaly detection. Those approaches rely
on the definition of a Linear Time independent (LTI) state space
synthetic stochastic model capturing observed temporal and spatial
correlations between observed traffic volumes during "normal" peri-
ods. The tracking of this normal model can be done with a Kalmann
Filter [59] or without it [38].
Our approach in this paper differs mainly from the above method
by the fact that we are analyzing the graph, a discrete object, rather
than a quantitativemetric like traffic volume. One can indeed extend
method applicable to volume anomaly detection to the normalized
energy time series we have developed in this paper. But the dif-
ference between large-scale event and local drift is so large in our
observations that a simple thresholding was shown to be sufficient.
Ricci curvature on graphs Recent works in Riemannian Geom-
etry from Gromov [30] and Perelman [50], were extended in the
past decade to discrete objects and graphs. This extension use in-
tensively the optimal transport approach developed by Lott and
Viliani [43]. Ollivier developed in[47] a tractable formula to com-
pute the Ricci curvature over graphs. This attracted a lot of interest
in the research community in machine learning and bioinformatics
[63][52][28]. In [62], Weber et al. presented an approach to obtain a
geometric description of highly dynamic networks. They use a dif-
ferent approach of discretization of the Ricci curvature elaborated
by Forman [27]. The relationship between the two approaches have
been explained in [55]. Forman’s curvature depends on a topologi-
cal description of the Ricci and is defined with respect to polygonal
meshes while Ollivier’s curvature is centered around the propaga-
tion of Markov Chains and optimal transports characterization of
the space. Our assumption is that the AS graph evolves following a
latent stochastic process and therefore it is natural for us to favor
Ollivier’s description.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented a new graph embedding technique for moni-
toring large scale networks. Our method relies on the curvature,
a geometric property linking local scale to global properties. The
Ricci curvature that has been initially defined in continuous mani-
fold is extended to graph through the Ollivier-Ricci curvature. We
use the Ollivier-Ricci curvature to embed the AS level graph into
a K-dimensional space. In the embedded space we evaluate the
variations of the projection of nodes that have seen a BGP update.
This enables us to define a new monitoring system for tracking and
detecting large scale events that are changing the overall topology
of Internet. We validate the monitoring system over BGP feeds
gathered at 20 collectors and we were able to detect in less than 2
minutes all major BGP events that have made the headlines in BGP
monitoring blogs.
The described methodology can be easily extended to any type
of complex networks and is attractive for purposes beyond the one
mentioned in this paper, such as social network analysis, intra and
inter protein networks, etc.
One of the main challenge remains to improve the time required
for the computation of the optimal transport. This is a very ac-
tive topic in the machine learning community, see [56] [58]. This
would allow the methodology to be deployed live and will provide
a complementary monitoring tool for Network Operating Centers.
7 APPENDIX
7.1 Landmark Selection algorithms
One obvious way of selecting landmarks is to use the BGP collecting
points. But these trivial landmarks will be biased. Nevertheless,
collection points have a major advantage as they are accessing an
actual BGP feed while for other choice of landmark the AS level
topology should be inferred from any other point.
In order to avoid the bias of collection points and to choose
suitable landmarks, several approaches are possible. The random
choice is appealing because of its simplicity, with the added benefits
of security as an attacker may not know which parts of the network
he should avoid perturbing to remain undetected. However, random
choice in graphs is known to be biased and can result into an over-
representation of certain parts of the network.
Another approach leverages the vertex position in the graph.
Vertices with high centrality are potentially good landmarks as a
large number of shortest paths go through them. Similarly, ver-
tices with the highest degrees are also good candidates for being
landmarks.
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Finally, in the context of AS level graphs, tier-1 and tier-2 ASes
are another set of candidates. Indeed these vertices are also closely
related to the high centrality and high degree vertices.
All these above approaches besides the random approach have
a concentration bias, i.e., only central part of the graph where
most paths converge is accounted [39]. Moreover, picking highly
connected vertices implies more expensive computations for cal-
culating the optimal transport distance. Curvature to these central
points are also less sensitive to the effects of events.
In order to deal with these issues, we develop a sampling method
to pick good landmarks. To understand intuitively properties of
a good set of landmarks, we should go back to the definition of
curvature. Let’s first look at the sphere that has a positive curvature.
By choosing only two landmarks at opposites poles of the sphere
and by monitoring the geodesics from these two poles one can
detect any changes happening on the sphere surface. While for
negative and flat curvature shapes we need an infinity of landmarks
to cover all the surface. In general, the geometry resulting from
a real graph cannot be simply interpreted as a sphere. One can
assume the graph and its underlying geometry is divided into flat
valleys or districts separated by high mountains. Good landmarks
should still be positioned in such a way that they have large positive
curvature in between them in order to have diverging geodesics
and not be positioned in the same valleys or district. We leverage
this intuition and inspired by the connection made in [47] between
Markov Chain, and curvature, we use a random walk approach to
find a satisfying set of landmarks, positioned in with high positive
curvature place, far apart from each other to ensure they are not in
the same region of the graph and randomly disseminated through
the graph to avoid a collusion with an attacker .
However, deriving curvature to all other vertices of the network
is too complex to be implemented in practice. A necessary condition
for a vertex in the graph to have high curvature is to have a relatively
large number of neighbors. One can therefore use the landmark set
diversity as defined in Eq. 4 as a simple metric to assess possibility
of high curvature.
Based on the above considerations, we have developed aMetropolis-
Hasting landmarks selection mechanism, we name lazy random
walk, that will select landmarks that validate the above constraints.
The Metropolis-Hasting algorithm consists of randomly perturbing
a sample set according to a proposal distribution д(S → S ′). The
distribution д(S → S ′) gives the probability of changing a sample
S to a sample S’. We accepts or rejects a new sample set S ′ based
on a quality score P(·) and a variable α . The sampling process con-
sists of first choosing randomly among L candidate landmarks, one
vertex v as a candidate for being exchanged with another vertex
w , i.e., S → S ′ = (S − {v}) ∪ {w}. The vertexw is chosen through
a random walk among the neighbor of v that are not in the set S
and v itself. The sampling probabilities are д(S → S ′) = 1|C | and
д(S ′ → S) = 1|C ′ | , whereC = (N (v) − S) ∪v is the set of neighbors
of v that are not in S plus the vertex v and C ′ = (N (w) − S) ∪v is
the set of neighbors ofw beside v that are not in S . This sampling
mechanism ensures that landmark candidate have not too similar
neighborhoods and therefore are in different districts of the graph.
Now let’s define the score function P. As explained before, the
landmarks should be chosen in such a way that they have large
Algorithm 1MCMC landmark selection algorithm
Input:
Initial Sample S
Quality Score P(·)
number of iterations iter
Output:
Result Sample R
1: procedure Sampling
2: R ← S
3: for i := 1 to iter do
4: Select vertex v ∈ S randomly
5: C ← (N (v) − S) ∪ {v}
6: Select vertexw ∈ C randomly
7: C ′ ← (N (w) − S) ∪ {v}
8: Select α randomly from [0,1]
9: S ′ = (S − {v}) ∪ {w}
10: д(S → S ′) = 1|S | 1|C |
11: д(S ′ → S) = 1|S ′ | 1|C ′ |
12: A(S → S ′) = P (S ′)P (S )
д(S ′→S )
д(S→S ′) =
P (S ′)
P (S )
|C |
|C ′ |
13: if α < A(S → S ′) then
14: S ← S ′
15: if P(S) > P(R) then
16: R ← S
17: end if
18: end if
19: end for
20: end procedure
positive curvature in between each other. It is however infeasible
to derive for each step of the Hasting-Metropolis the K2 curvatures
values between K landmarks. We therefore resort to a simpler
heuristic. We define GT1,2 (S) as being the set of non-intersecting
shortest path from candidate landmarks in S to the AS identified
as Tier 1 and Tier 2. By non-intersecting, we mean that there exist
no points in common between these twi shortest path. The Tier-
1 and Tier-2 vertices are chosen because we already know that
these vertices will seat in the center of the network, i.e., around
the equator for a spherical geometry. Now, by comparing the size
of the two sets GT1,2 (S) and GT1,2 (S ′), one can assess which of the
landmark sets S or S ′ have the largest positive curvature to the
center of the network. This means that we can choose the scoring
function as :
Pupdated(S) = ∥GT1,2 (S)∥
With the above-defined function, we can use the classical Hasting-
Metropolis rejection scheme described in algorithm 1 and imple-
ment the sampling.
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